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REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS
FESTCORIFT FUR KARL BINDING. Zum 4, Juni 1911. By many
haids. Erster Band. Verlag von Wilhelm Englemann, Leipzig,
1911. Pp. 521. (Continued from last issue.)
ATTEMPTS IN THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE.
By Auigust Fi2ger. Pp. 259-330.
Binding made a notable contribution to legal sciene in his "Norms
and their Transgression" in discovering that these norms which in
form are always commands or prohibitions, are divisible into three
classes according to the kind of objects sought and the manner of
seeking them: Prohibitions against injuries, prohibitions against
dangers [to rights] (classified also under the larger grouping of ef-
fectuating prohibitions), and simple prohibitions; corresponding to
effectuating commands, promotive commands, and simple commands.
In effectuating prohibitions (Bewirkungsverboten) the norm in-
terdicts a distinct consequence definitely pointed out. All acts are for-
bidden which accomplish a certain result. Prohibitions of action
(Tatigkeitsverboten) proscribe definite acts. Effectuating prohibitions
accordingly are broader in scope. They relate not to the specific
method of acting, the means, but to the effect of action. For example,
no legislation could undertake to set out all the methods of killing.
It must limit itself to the result; no other form of statement tech-
nically is possible.
Prohibitions against injury are supplemented by prohibitions
against dangers, and prohibitions of action. Acts which, measured
by the test of prohibitions against injury, have only a partial opera-
tion, fall under both of the other groups. An act in hand which
would contravene a prohibition against injury may be considered
under prohibitions against dangers or prohibitions against action. The
statutes, however, go a step further, and generally forbid attempts to
transgress an effectuating prohibition. The Swedish Criminal Code is
mentioned as an exception.
There is raised here a question which is at once fundamental and
technical. The legislator must clearly distinguish whether an attempt
is to be differently treated than an accomplished act. If this propo-
sition is denied then no special treatment of attempts is necessary.
If he consents to it, then it will appear that legislative treatment may
take on different forms. The form of legislative statement may be so
broad that it may include within its reach the simplest attempts and
the most aggravated completed acts. This method of solution will be
considered undesirable by those who believe that a criminal statute
should not be subjected to the wide range of social, political, and
religious influence which may play upon the judicial judgment. If
attempts are to be specially limited then this may' be done either in
the special part of the code treating of specific offenses, or there may
be a unified treatment of the subject in the general part. This is
purely a technical question. The only problem is as to the method,
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with a view of alleviating the difficulties of legislative statement. If
there is otherwise no choice, the preferable method would seem to
be a complete formulation of attempts in the general part of the code,
instead of detailed treatment in the special part. There is also the
much controverted question, whether an attempt should be punished
as severely as a completed act.
The detail of this essay deals with attempts in present German
law, and according to the preliminary draft of the Criminal Code.
The whole article seems worthy of translation, and there is much in it
of pure scientific interest in a department of criminal law which has
for us had little if any scientific consideration. No other trunk of
criminal law, it may also be stated, has had a more interesting or
curious growth than this.
LAW IN POLITICALLY UNORGANIZED PLACES. By Rudolf Stammler.
Pp. 331-373.
This is a study of-law, or its substitute, under Robinson Crusoe
conditions based on a literary theme suggested by Jules Verne's" Chil-
dren of Captain Grant." There have always been large stretches of
earth where the external trappings of law were not to be found. Hoff-
man, in-his "Devil of the Sands," in describing the imaginary situs
of his story even mentions the advantage to such places of not having
judges and lawyers. The practical possibilities of these situations
have been brought conspicuously to notice by recent developments in
aviation. Apparently there may be cases where external order and
restraint are required, but where law does not exist. Stammler denies
this and asserts the unlimited dominion of law.
Law and state are not systematically similar ideas. Law is a
formal condition of human will. It has the attribute of positing ends.
The state, on the contrary, can only be thought of as applying the
legal concept; without this concept, the state is impossible. In fact,
the term "state" is a somewhat recent invention. Loening has shown
in his handbook that Germanic as well as Roman usage did not employ
it. The same writer has further shown that a technical distinction
between "state" and "Stadt" (self-governing city) arose slowly, and
that it was not until after the 16th century that a precise meaning
attached to the terms stato and etat.
There is a three-fold order of thought here: First, the idea of
law, then legal order, and finally the state. The idea of law is a
universally valid and formal process by which ends of action are set
up. This is an abstract notion, and it does not come into historical
being apart from a special content of ends which are called, concretely.
laws. The notion of state is an after idea and is not only dependent
on legal order, but presupposes it; but it involves an added element
of a definite territorial domain.
Naturally, Stammler's thesis brings him to the consideration' f
the "Law of Nature"-that condition of things anterior to the state,
which has been always a favorite subject with the older schools of
legal philosophy. Stammler asserts that the theory of a "natural
condition" is only a preliminary thought; it isolates the individual;
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but there is yet present the external relation of the individual to others.
The mind seeks unity, and there is presented to it the idea of neces-
sity. There is no such thing as an unrestrained "natural freedom";
there must be order in the manifestations of human will.
Before he gets very far, the author walks upon and exhorts from
an old platform, the planks of which have become quite familiar to
the jurist through the work Richtiges Recht. Without an appre-
ciably close connection with the points already discussed, Stammler
explains the notion of the obligatory will, the will that binds men
together in a common effort (as Marx has expressed it) in the struggle
for-existence. The individual as a part of the community must par-
ticipate in the social will directed to social ends. Absolute necessity
is not to be thought of here in speaking of the necessity of the common
will. Teleological necessity, the necessity of unity and order, stand in
the place af causal necessity.
Admitting as proved, the necessity of legal regulation in polit-
ically unorganized places, a further difficulty is encountered as to
the content of this regulation. All sorts of difficulties may readily be
imagined in applying domiciliary law, or law having an extra-terri-
torial operation. Three preliminary solutions are presented: to remit
the controversy to the domicile; to draw the law of the domicile to
the forum; or to allow all existing systems to operate at one time.
Neither of these contingencies affords a solution. The country without
a political organization must furnish its own law. The content of this
law will depend on an infinite variety of conditions. History gives
several well authenticated examples of the self-generative force of law
in situations such as those under consideration.
The essay concludes with a statement of the world character of
law. The formal concept itself is one of unlimited extent, but the
material nature of law is historical and dependent on time and place.
CRa]N.uL ATUTEMPTS AND TiiE DmiFn CRImiN % CODE. By August
Schoetensack. Pp. 376-434.
Knowledge of legal injuries resulting from certain acts and omis-
sions compels the establishment of commands and prohibitions. If
these rules stand independent of legislative motive they are ineffectual
to produce the maximum of obedience, or to ward off the dangers at
which they aim. Norms which have a general application to the affairs
of life have a hypothetical character, but their general and hypothetical
nature should not take on an added intellectualistic meaning, since
otherwise legal rules would become like the finalities of natural laws.
We must avoid the paralogism which identifies the propositions of
logic with legal norms, as well as the error which assumes that hypo-
thetical rules necessarily issue in hypothetical judgments. Rules of
law remain genuine imperatives even in the forum of logic.
The mind is not a copy of reality, and the norm of attempts must
contain a subjective factor. It cannot prescribe, "You shall not cause
such a result," but it must command, "You shall not do that which
you may know will cause such a result." There is met a kind of in-
terpretation of norms which leads to purely subjective consequences.
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Thus, Lammasch says that the illegality of an act is to be judged by
the perception of casuality of the actor, and not by the result of the
act. This view needs the bridle of an objective standard.
Regarding the concept of result as a logical-teleological idea, two
possible methods of consideration are presented-the synthetical, and
the analytical (after Swigart). The writer adopts the latter. The
starting-point is an illegal result in the sense of an objective com-
pleted act or an attempt. If the result is admitted, then the inquiry
leads to the question whether the subjective norm has been over-
stepped. The writer criticises Finger's theory of attempts, and be-
lieves that as formulated it cannot stand without the additions made in
the thesis.
The first part of the present essay deals with the general theory
and analysis of delictual attempts, and the second division treats in
some detail the draft code in the light of the author's views. The sec-
ond part contains also a useful list of punishable and non-punishable
misdemeanor attempts. The theoretical part is a valuable contribution
and would be useful in translation for general legal science.
DumiNG IN Swiss CRIMINAL LAW. By Alfred Freiherrn von Over-
beck. Pp. 437-457.
This is a faithful account of the legislative situation in Switzer-
land, past and present, covering .dueling. Two principal Cantonal
groups are noticed, in one of which no legislative enactments are
found, and in the other of which there are special statuatory provis-
ions treating dueling in a variety of ways as a special offense. Full
references are given to the sources, both of legislation and of com-
mentary. The author makes no effort to deal with dueling any further
than to state the bare legal situation as it has existed and as it now
exists. The Code, of course, follows the lead of Germany in prescrib-
ing penalties under various conditions.
Dueling, it would seem, is rapidly approaching the stage of
disuse when it will be regarded everywhere in the same way as the
primitive trials by ordeal. In our own geographical position this in-
stitution has already passed into the realm of the historical, and
there is little in this essay that is of primary legal interest to us. In
those countries where dueling is still recognized by the state, either
overtly or by the process of dead-letter, the ethical sense of honor, and
a residuum of the savage in every man, perhaps, still approve the
charge of the Irish judge to the jury in a death case, when he said.
"You are instructed that according to law this is murder, but for
my part .I never met a fairer duel in my whole life."
ORIGIN AND TEANING OF THE SOCIOLOGICAIk SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL LAW.
By Xaver Gretener. Pp. 461-521.
Within the last three decades two schools of thought have under-
taken to open up new highways in criminalistic progress. One of
these is the Anthropological which is associated with the name of
Lombooso; the other is the Sociological, but it is less clear, so the
writer thinks, who is to be credited as its founder. German literary
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usage, so it is stated, makes a conventional opposition between the An-
thropological or Italian school and the Sociological or von Lisztian
school. Even the most severe critics of von Liszt have acknowledged
him as the unquestioned leader and founder of the Sociological School.
The proposition advanced and argued in detail in the first division
of this essay is that not von Liszt but Ferri has the claim of priority
in the Sociological School of criminal law. The discussion is in the
nature of a reply to an article published by Dr. Fritz Horn in the
Austrian Journal of Criminal Law.
Ferri and von Liszt have in common a strong deterministic start-
ing-point. In conformity with the Classical School, but in contrast to
the "Third School" (Merke], and Liepmann), both regard the prob-
lem of accountability in the strict sense as inseparably connected with
the question of freedom of will. Thus the guilty will falls with free-
dom of the will. All that remains is the anti-social act and the so-
cially dangerous author of the act. From these premises arises the
necessity of a new basis of criminal science and criminal punishment.
With the theoretical foundation of this necessity there is connected
the practical consideration that against the increasing flood of crime
and impotency of the law to erect effective dams against it, resort must
be had to the causes of this phenomenon, by the methods reached in
the field of the natural sciences. The first task is to investigate the
factors of crime-'9tude 9tiologique du dlinquent-which has been the
platform of Italian Positivism for the last generation.
The characteristic ideas and the points of agreement between
Ferri and von Liszt are in the following specific positions of the So-
ciological School:
1. Ferri classifies three groups of crime factors which von Liszt
adopted in his Lehtrbuch.
2. According to Ferri the social factors increase in importance
with advancing civilization sans prgtendre exclure par la l'action con-
cornitante des facteurs biologiques et telluriques, with which von Liszt
accords.
3. Every act of man, according to Ferri, and therefore every
crime, is the necessary product of his physical and psychical organi-
zation, and the natural and social atmosphere in which he is born.
The language of von Liszt is strikingly similar.
4. The mission of sociological punishment, or more accurately
social reaction, is war against the causes of crime.
5. In place of legal accountability as the material of criminal
reaction there is substituted the anti-social impulse, the temibilita del
delinquente.
6. In order to apply properly the instrument of social reaction,
it is necessary to individualize crimes by regarding the bio-sociological
classes of offenders.
7. The concept of atonement is put aside for the idea of adapt-
ability-the classification of responsibles and irresponsibles is replaced
by adaptables and unadaptables. When social adaptation is im-
possible, threats of punishment and penal execution have no motivat-
ing function.
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8. The adaptable class is to be harmonized with the will of so-
ciety by different varieties of punishment; the unadaptable class is to
be excluded from the possibility of social danger. Punishment is re-
duced to the level of protection merely.
9. All admeasurements of punishment are to be abolished.
10. The parallel noted between the past treatment of insanity
and the future treatment of crime shows the incompatability of the
ideas of guilt and punishment with the views of the Sociological
School.
11. The interests of public security are emphasized, but both
writers are equally indefinite in their measures of security.
12. Criminal law is a science in the strict sense. It is a special
department of general sociology and its departments are criminal an-
thropology and criminal statistics.
The vigor of a new attitude toward crime is clearly .shown by an
effort such as the one under review. If the question had not been
raised, perhaps with such information as we already possessed, no
doubt would have been entertained of Ferri's originality and priority,
notwithstanding the value of the attinutations eclectiques of von
Liszt.
The significance of the sociological thought in criminal law is now
peculiarly of importance, and especially in Germany, where a com-
pleted draft of the Criminal Code is under consideration which rep-
resents the practical issue of a battle among the schools. While par-
tial revisions will be necessary, particularly in the general part of the
draft in the light of existing criticism, yet as a whole it will be and
remain a prominent mark-stone in the history of modern criminal
legislation. While von Liszt thinks that he sees in the draft the ex-
pression of the essentials of the school which he represents, yet von
Birkmeyer takes the view that the basic ideas of the Sociological School
are rejected. Again, Kollman says that in the draft "the absence
of principle has itself been raised to a principle." To further illus-
trate the flexibility of opinion here, Sommer even thinks that Lombroso
laid the foundations of both the German and Austrian draft codes.
The writer finds that the specific claims of Lombroso and of the
Sociological School have been ignored, and that upon the cardinal
question lying at the basis of the controversy between the Schools, the
draft asserts the proposition of accountability in the strict sense.
Yet while the draft retains the old views concerning crime and
punishment (and to this extent, perhaps shows the hegemony of the
Classical School) still it also shows the influence of the Sociological
School in a variety of principles. The etiology of crime is recognized;
the principle of security has made a distinct impression on the Aus-
trian, Swiss, and German codes; individualization of treatment has
had a limited reception; and the social background of crime is par-
tially admitted by provisions for indemnification by the state of the
persons injured by crime. The writer concludes that-the authors *of
the draft codes have deserved well in defending these proposals in
legislation against the basic ideas of the Sociological School in that
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while adopting measures to humanize the criminal law they have also
retained the notion of guilt and differences of guilt.
Apart from the controversial nature of this essay, it affords a
valuable insight into the latest thought in criminal science. The
characteristically thorough literary apparatus used is itself worthy of
mention.
Chicago. ALBERT KOCOUREK.
IL PERICOLO DI OFFESA NELLA DiEsA LEGITTImA, Estratto dal Suppl.
alla Rivista Percale, vol. XX, fase. M. Per Gilio Battaglini,
Pp. 29.
This is an article by Prof. Battaglini on the "Danger of Offense
in Self Defense." As usual with Prof. Battaglini the discussion is
based upon wide and deep learning, and is illumined by an acute in-
telligence.
Legitimate self defense is one of the most interesting divisions
of the penal law. Self defense will never be expunged from the code.
It will disappear only when social disharmony has disappeared. When
crime shall have been abolished and shall be a devil's dream, self de-
fense will no longer be needed. There are two sorts of defense: one
by the state, and the other by the individual. A prime function of
the state is to maintain order, and, by implication, to suppress crime.
But the state cannot always be present at the commission of crime,
and so it becomes necessary for the benefit of social order itself that
the state should allow the individual to do what it cannot perform.
How disintegrating it would be to prevent a unit of society from doing
for himself what the whole society itself cannot do for him. [Why
should the aggressor be subjected to more punishment after the person
attacked has acted against him? Because the state still retains the
power to punish, and does not delegate it to the one attacked. The
latter is no agent of the state to punish. The state recognizes the
right and even the duty of a member of society to defend himself
from attack, because the suppression of crime is for the advantage of
the state, and because it would be futile for the state to order a person
to abstain from self-preservation. The law is reasonable, and recog-
nizes psychological impossibilities, as well as physical ones. Self de-
fense is not a subjective right, but a juridical authorization.
By what is individual defense determined? Every being strug-
gles for its own existence and every act that tends to batter down
the conditions of its life is combatted with the fierceness born of
the most intense feeling and the most driving instinct of nature. You
may defend yourself against an imminent danger, or against an act
that has already brought injury upon you. In the second case the
state leaves you no alternative but conformity to the established pro-
cedure of law; what is past cannot be prevented, but can be recti-
fied, or punished, or repaired. In the first case the state is powerless
to aid you, and hence it gives you the right to aid yourself. The
right of self defense is, therefore, based upon necessity; if the right
be not exercised at the time, it cannot be exercised afterwards. Ac-
cording to the Italian code the aggressed person may attack only in
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defense of life or limb, and not of honor, or of property, unless the
attack upon property be connected with a danger to the person.
Contrary to some authorities the author maintains that defense
can never consist in inaction. Defense is action.
In judging of the act of the aggressed person the court must put
himself into the place of the former. The act must be looked at not
in cold blood, but with all the concomitants, which excited the pas-
sion, and confused the mind. This gives a hint as to the point of view
of the author in criminal law. It is the psychological point of view.
We are not surprised, then, to see him cannonading the outworn yet
ever living illogical position that an insane person and an infant in-
capable of understanding obligations are responsible for their acts.
There is no such thing as objective responsibility, or objective blame.
There is only subjective culpa, and responsibility, to which the sanc-
tions of law attach. Recently in America the Committee on Insanity
of the Amuerican Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology slaugh-
tered this dragon of seemingly everlasting life. Prof. Battaglini is
thoroughly alive to the baneful consequences of the theory. We must
understand perfectly and once for all that punishment is not, and
cannot, either logically or from humanitarian considerations, be meted
out to incapables and incompetents; nor can imprisonment contem-
plated by the codes which is destined for competents be inflicted upon
those who do not fall into this class. Whether one is a positivist or
not, there can be no two views upon this point; the infant, recognized
by law to be incapable of crime, and the insane must be segregated
from society for the protection of society, but they must not be sub-
jected to the same treatment as other offenders are.
A physician has been'called to the bedside of a patient whose
life is in danger. The driver of his vehicle stops in the road and re-
fuses to proceed. Has the physician the right to point a pistol at the
driver and threaten to shoot unless he proceeds? Does the definition
which may be framed from the elements so far given include such a
case? The author answers in the affirmative. Was not the act of the
driver unjust? Was it not violent? And may I not oppose violence
to violence to protect life or limb? The rightness of the answer de-
pends, of course, upon the definition of violence. Did the driver com-
mit violence by standing still and refusing to go on? There is no
doubt that the law should provide for such cases.
New York City. IROBErT FER. im.
SUL FONDAMENTO GIUTIDICO DELLA QUERELA PRIVATA. Dell' avv.
Giulio Q. Battaglini. Estratto dalla Rivista di Dilitto e Pro-
cedura Penale. Anno II. Fase. 3 1911. Pp. 15.
The juridical foundation of private accusation is the theme of
the pamphlet before us. The work is an analysis of the philosophy and
the psychology of the law of accusation, public and private, and a
comparative study of the subject. The author distinguishes between
the criminal procedure of England and America, and that of Italy
and other European countries. In England and America the mode
of procedure in accusation is, with one exception-the common as-
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sault-uniform; it is entirely public, that is, instituted by the people.
and not by a private complainant. The prosecutor is the state, and
not a private person. But in Italy there are two sources of prosecu-
tion: one the state, and the other, private parties. There have been
many theories concerning the principle underlying the institution of
prosecution by the community and by \the individual. But the true
principle seems to be that expounded by the author. There are cer-
tain acts which, although they are declared to be wort',y of punish-
ment, do not provoke general resentment and indignation; and there
are others that do. There are interests which are immediately pri-
vate, and interests which are immediately public. (See my summary
in this Journal of an article by Prof. Battaglini, September, 1911.)
Acts which touch the public interest more immediately are prosecuted
by the state; acts which touch more immediately private interests are
prosecuted by individuals. So it happens that some acts of the
latter kind, although they are prohibited by the code, go unpunished,
because in the absence of a complaint by the person injured by an
act, no one has a right to play informer or prosecutor. Of such a
sort are certain thefts between members of a family. It is better in
these cases that the veil be kept tight than that it be drawn aside.
Society itself will be the gainer by such procedure. But acts, like
assaults with a deadly weapon, are acts in which the public is eminently
and intimately concerned, and may, therefore, be complained of by
the representative of the state.
Law should reflect the state of civilization of a people; and social
utility should be the touchstone of just law. The author believes that
if the preceding two propositions are true the times need not a nar-
rowing of the field of private accusation, but a widening of it.
New York City. ROBERT FERRARI.
IL TITOLO PER LA CONSTITUZIONE DI PARTE CiviLE, IN EsPEcm IN RAP-
PORTO AI SINDICATE PROFESSIONALI. Per Gennaro Escobedo, Societa
Tipografica; Turin. Pp. 94.
In this treatise Escobedo deals with the question of allowing in-
terested parties to take part in criminal prosecutions, with the view
to the solution of the problem in its subdivision regarding the right of
professions, trades, or eleemosynary institutes to take part in the
punishment of those whose acts contravene their tenets. He takes up
the practical and philosophical reform of law, in which the Italian
mind both delights and excels. He desires to base his reforms on a
solid foundation of fact, so that they may meet the exigencies and
demands of life with certainty and without need of legal fiction or
presumptions. New relations between men give rise to the need of
new laws; and these laws should be determined by the new needs which
they are aimed to meet, the new law should be based on the necessity
of things and not be patches on old juridical principles. Such addi-
tions, for the purpose of meeting new requirements, are generally not
in accord with the principles of the norm to which they are super-
added, and do not generally go deep enough to satisfy the new need.
Hence they fail in their purpose, and give rise to doubts, fictions,
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and presumptions, which should have no place in any legal system.
Every legal system should be accurately fitted to the facts of the
life of the people, whose freedom it is made to protect. In speaking
of a French statute, which extended a section of the code covering an
individual right to corporations, and which failed in its purpose be-
cause the criminal code required a proof of direct damage,, which, as
was shown, was suffered by the members of the corporation, not the
corporation itself, Escobedo writes (page 9) : "This new provision is
not in accord with the juridical principles which had governed the
situation. Hence an inevitable uncertainty of interpretation, which
should lead jurists to study closely whether the juridical principle,
with which the statute, required by the needs of life, seem to conflict,
is true and exact."
This, he thinks, is the most usual fault, from which nothing but
confusion results (page 9):
"Nor could it be otherwise. When confronted with the signs of
some new need in life, legislators usually do not, in their efforts to meet
it by statute, proceed on general and rational principles, but endeavor
above everything else to give a remedy or make provision for the new
circumstances."
What is needed in every reform, the object of which is the satis-
faction of a need, created by historical evolution, not theretofore non-
existent, is that the new circumstances be first studied from every
point of view, principles by which it is governed determined, -nd its
norm found. This should then be worked into the legal system m
the form of a statute and every mediate, as well as immediate effect
on other statutds should be examined so that no incongruities be left.
For, every incongruity, doubt or legal fiction is the work of loose juri-
dical reasoning or of an attempt to govern one fact by the norm of
another because they have a superficial resemblance. We may add
that more often than not it will be found that the ancient principles
of law are correct and are readily adaptable to new needs. The error
lies generally in the effort to govern the relations arising from one
set of facts by a statute made to fit by a series of fictions-a legal
short-cut leading, as the ramifications are followed to their necessary
ends, into inevitable blind-alleys.
But, to return to our special subject, Escobedo applies these prin-
ciples to participation in criminal prosecutions with a view to de-
termining to whom this right belongs, and how the new need of
modern life for the protection of good faith in certain trades, for the
maintenance of responsibility in certain professions and for the re-
quirement of certain charities to children and animals may be as-
sured by allowing the trades, professions, and charitable organiza-
tion to form a parte civile in prosecution for contraventions of such
acts. To determine these latter questions, the problem of the parte
civile in general must first be determined, then that of its availability
by representatives. As the parte civile is an institution unknown to
common law, Escobedo's solution of its difficulties is of little in-
terest to English readers-Sufficeth to say, that civil law allows the
victim of a crime to become a civil party in a criminal action for
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the purpose, as it is generally held, of obtaining compensation in
damages. Escobedo sees that this definition prevents the bar, the med-
ical profession, to say nothing of trades, whose membership is in no
wise restricted, and of such eleemosynary societies as those for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, from taking part in the
prosecution of a lawyer or doctor for unprofessional practices, or for
practicing without a license for acts of dishonesty or cruelty. The
entity can allege no pecuniary damage. This admitted defect, due to
a need caused by modern social development, which did not exist in
the XVIII century, cannot be cured by simply giving the entities-the
right to appear as parte civile, as the French attempted to do, for they
cannot meet the requirements. By applying the general principles,
which we have elucidated, he would alter the prerequisites of a parte
civile allowing the proof of even any legal damages, whether pecuniary
or not. And, as this is not sufficient, for we have seen the entities
suffer no legal damage, and by a, study of the right of representation
we can see that an entity is distinct from its components, with distinct
interests, and that it, as such, is no legal damage by fraudulent com-
petition, we must give them the right to appear as civil parte for po-
litical injury for them. This they suffer by the discredit put upon
them by fraud committed by their members or others.
Without going into his detailed arguments, we will give his con-
clusions.
(a) The old rule concerning the parte civile shall remain in
force. No attempt should be made to extend it to persons, corpora-
tions, or entities in needs arisen since its formulization and funda-
mentally dissimilar to those which gave rise to it. The superficial
similarity of the need of intervention in criminal prosecution should
not be aided by legal fictions for the purpose of permitting interven-
tion as a parte civile, in cases where none of the prerequisites of the
institution can be found.
(b) Anyone who has had a legal right infringed by a crime.
can become a private party to the prosecution, although he cannot
allege pecuniary damages.
(c) If the crime has caused the death of the victim, his right as
a parte civile may be represented by any relations to whom he owed
a duty of support, or him in whom such duty has devolved. Damages
for the loss may be recovered by surviving wife, husband, lineal de-
scendant or heir in the order of succession.
(d) If the victim of the crime dies independently of it, his
right, as parte civile forms part of his estate.
(e) In ease of incapacity, he may be represented as above.
(f) Without injury to any legal right, the following persons
may become private parties to assist the public prosecution:
(1) Entities legally formed for the protection of professional
public ends.
(2) The condemned (or his legal representative), whose sen-
tence was reversed by a higher court, in a prosecution for crime for
which he was condemned.
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(3) The defendant in any action for slander or libel in a
prosecution against the plaintiff for the crime alleged.
A comparison of this theory for meeting the needs of modern
society with the French statutory reforms, of which we have already
spoken, will make clear at a glance the advantages of Escobedo's
practical philosophy of law. It is his method of dealing with the
question and not the question itself which is of most interest to the
American lawyer and sociologist, for it seems absurd, if not inethical,
to the American mind, to allow, for example, the widow of a murdered
man to become a party to the prosecution for murder with the object
of recovering damages for her husband's death. But his method of
taking the new combination of facts and by the application of ad-
mittedly valid general principles to it, deriving new norms to govern
it is clearly superior to the old method of extending rights by statute
and creating presumptions by judicial proceeding. It is not only
scientific and accurate in the first instance, but it does not lead into
positions from which no power of logic can extract us without humil-
iating self-contradiction. But, apart from this, his project of al-
lowing the bar and medical profession (as well as certain trades)
to become a party in criminal proceeding for the punishment of crimes,
which affect their moral standing in the community might well be
adopted in the United States.
But, to return to the treatise, we have nothing but praise for
It titolo ti per la costititzione di parte civie in especie in rapporto ai
sindicati professionali. It is clearly and interestingly written. It is
philosophical, practical and complete. One cannot say too much in
praise of it.
Philadelphia. Joim LISLE.
